American top diplomat Marco Rubio has warned that the US is running out of options to sanction Russia, adding that “there are things that the Europeans can do on shadow fleet since a lot of these are happening in areas much closer to them.”
While it’s true that the EU can and must do more to curb Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, harmonising shadow fleet sanctions across the US, EU, and other allies is a practical, low-cost step that could significantly reduce Russia’s oil export revenues. When tankers blacklisted in Brussels are instantly mirrored in Washington — and vice versa — Russia’s export capacity shrinks, revenues fall, and sanctions regain credibility. The EU is doing its part in this area, yet it would gain from more robust support from the US side.
Additionally, the US is still buying $3.5B worth of oil products made from Russian crude, totally legal. Russian oil flows to India and Turkey, gets refined into jet fuel, then heads right back to America. The EU has banned this loophole. The US? Not yet.
There are other clear, concrete options for additional sanctions — targeting oil majors; large Russian banks that handle oil and gas payments, starting with Gazprombank; critical components and the defense industry; payment systems, including alternative channels, such as cryptocurrency; and Russia’s strategic projects in the Arctic.
Another key action the Trump Administration can take to devastate Russia’s war chest is to end US business ties with Russian energy. Oilfield services companies like SLB (Schlumberger) have expanded their operations in Russia, supplying tens of millions’ worth of materials.
Dekleptocracy, a US civil society group that researches Russia’s war economy and is a member of the B4Ukraine Coalition, has also identified several obscure but potentially crucial sanctions targets that it says could significantly disrupt Russia’s war machine.
According to the group, chemicals used to produce mechanical lubricants and military-grade tyres represent a critical vulnerability that US, EU, and UK policymakers could exploit.
Kristofer Harrison, the group’s president and a former State Department Russia expert, says these components are hard to replace and essential to Moscow’s ability to field tanks and continue fighting. Russia cannot produce the essential chemicals required for mechanical lubricants (engine oil, axle grease — everything that keeps mechanical warfare running) and relies on one Chinese company for almost 60% of its national supply.
Finally, it’s critical to expand secondary sanctions. India buys Russian oil, the UAE acts as an intermediary in various trades, dual-use technology reaches Russia through Central Asian countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. But the key challenge is China: supplying components, raw materials, chemicals, and facilitating payments. The only way to influence this is via secondary sanctions against financial institutions — blocking payments and excluding from the global market anyone who wants to do business with Russia.