To: European Commission and Council of the EU
Subject: Civil Society appeal to harmonise restrictive measures between Belarus and Russia
We, the undersigned civil society organisations, call on the European Union to harmonise restrictive measures imposed on Russia and Belarus in order to restrict Russia’s access to the critical goods and technologies sustaining its war of aggression against Ukraine.
For trade purposes, Russia and Belarus should be treated as part of a single Union State. All goods that can legally enter Belarus can be freely transferred into Russia as part of the two countries’ customs-free border arrangements. This is compounded by the Belarus leadership’s staunch support for and complicity in Russia’s war in Ukraine. There is evidence to suggest that Russia has exploited disparities in EU sanctions on Belarus and Russia to channel banned goods through Belarus. Without harmonisation between the two sanctions regimes, Belarus will continue to serve as a gateway for banned goods and services, undermining EU sanctions against Russia. The EU Parliament has recognised this in its 29 February Resolution calling “the sanctions against Belarus to be fully aligned with those against Russia” (para. 32).
Disparities in EU restrictive measures
In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the EU has introduced a wide-ranging package of sanctions and export controls limiting Russian access to EU goods, technologies and services. The EU has also imposed restrictive measures on Belarus in response to its regime’s internal repressions and its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Comparative analysis of the EU’s restrictive measures against Belarus and Russia conducted by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee (see Annex below) reveals significant disparities between the two sanctions regimes. These disparities include (but are not limited to) the following goods:
• Goods which could contribute to the enhancement of Russia’s industrial capacities including (among other goods) coal and several minerals; several chemicals; biodiesel; cellulose and several paper and wood products; iron and steel; several products made of aluminium, nickel, copper, zinc, tin and lead; industrial robots; electric motors and generators; and trains, several boats and other motor vehicles;
• Luxury goods;
• Semiconductors manufacturing equipment;
• Oil refining and liquefaction of natural gas;
• Tankers for the transport of crude oil or petroleum products; and
• Software for the management of enterprises and software for industrial design and manufacture.
These disparities are not adequately addressed by the “no re-export to Russia” clause introduced by Article 12g of Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878. This provision requires EU exporters to contractually prohibit the re-export of restricted goods to Russia when dealing with non-EU business partners. Its effectiveness in preventing sanctions circumvention depends on the sincerity of importers, and on corporate and trade transparency and enforceability in third countries. In the absence of reliable Belarus – Russia trade data, and in the context of Belarus’ membership of the Union State, its customs arrangements with Russia and its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, this provision cannot be depended on to prevent Belarus from re-exporting banned goods to Russia. This conclusion is borne out by evidence of circumvention through Belarus (see below).
The EU-Belarus-Russia trade route
Belarus appears to have positioned itself as Russia’s backdoor for EU-banned goods. EU exporters can legally sell goods to Belarus directly, or to other third countries with Belarus as the official transit point. The goods are then routinely transferred to Russia. This includes luxury goods as well as goods and technology that could contribute to Russia’s war effort.
The volume of trade through Belarus is not insignificant. According to Eurostat, between January and May 2023 Belarus imported goods from the EU worth €3.3 billion - amounting to 8% of Belarus’ imports. Macroeconomic data for the first six months of 2023 shows that 70% of Belarus’ total trade comprises trade in commodities with the Russian Federation. It is estimated that over 90% of Belarusian exports are to Russia – due in part to Belarus’ dependence on transit through Russian ports and railways. According to official statistics, 6 million tonnes of goods were transhipped from Belarus via Russian ports in H1 2023, compared to just 1.5 million tonnes in H1 2022 – most containing petroleum products, chemicals, and artificial fertilisers, all of which are subject to EU sanctions.
Customs data obtained by the Russian-language media outlet Vertksa records nearly 1,000 new and/or luxury cars shipped to Russia from Belarus, valued at more than $100 million, since February 2022. The vehicles’ countries of origin include Germany, Italy, Sweden, Austria, Ireland, and Belgium. In one case, Belarus luxury car dealer Atlant-M Britaniya exported almost $5 million worth of luxury vehicles to Russia between January and October 2023, including vehicles produced by Mercedes-Benz, BMW, and Audi. A Russian shareholder of Atland-M Britaniya co-owns another business whose website specifically offers Russians the opportunity to purchase European cars. These vehicles are prohibited for export to Russia under Annex XVIII to Council Regulation (EU) 2022/428.
In some cases, companies registered in other third countries serve as intermediaries, ostensibly importing goods from Europe via Belarus, but instead re-routing them from Belarus to Russia. In one case, Kazakh-based KBR-Technologies LLP ordered high-tech semiconductor production equipment and other goods from Europe for delivery to a Belarusian warehouse. However, according to a letter obtained by reporters from OCCRP, KBR-Technologies later ordered the Belarus warehouse to change the destination of some of the goods to Russia. This is corroborated by macroeconomic data which shows that since February 2022, trade has significantly (and inexplicably) increased between Belarus and Georgia and between Belarus and Kazakhstan. The export to Russia of semiconductor production equipment is prohibited under Annex VII of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/328.
In another scheme, luxury goods were exported from Poland and Lithuania to Belarus, with Kyrgyzstan the supposed destination. In actuality, some 250 tons of luxury goods (worth more than 30 million roubles) were offloaded in Belarus, before reportedly being transferred to Russia. Such clothing is prohibited for export to Russia under Annex XVIII to Council Regulation (EU) 2022/428.
Recommendation
We call on the EU to harmonise restrictive measures imposed on Russia and Belarus.
Specifically, the EU should address the disparity in export bans on:
• Goods which could contribute to the enhancement of Russia’s industrial capacities;
• Luxury goods;
• Semiconductors manufacturing equipment;
• Oil refining and liquefaction of natural gas;
• Tankers for the transport of crude oil or petroleum products; and
• Software for the management of enterprises and software for industrial design and manufacture.
The EU should also replicate its Russia transit ban for Belarus.
Without these additional measures, Belarus will continue to act as a backdoor for the transfer of EU goods and technology into Russia.
Sincerely,
Signatories:
- The B4Ukraine Coalition
- Dixi Group
- Green Alternative
- Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO)
- International Partnership on Human Rights
- Kyiv School of Economics
- Norwegian-Ukrainian Friendship Association
- PR Army
- Progressive Shopper
- Razom We Stand
- Resilient Ukraine
- StateWatch
- State Capture
- U8 Ukrainian Analyticial Centre
- Business and Human Rights Resource Centre
- Zevin Asset Management