Dear Commissioner Dan Jørgensen,
We, the undersigned civil society organisations, urge the European Commission to strengthen the proposed REPowerEU Regulation on phasing out fossil fuel imports from the Russian Federation. While the proposal is a crucial step forward in banning Russian energy purchases, in its current form it falls short of its stated goal.
We recognise and commend several strong features of the Commission’s draft. For example, Article 7 introduces much-needed transparency and traceability requirements for imported gas, which is essential to curbing gas laundering via intermediaries. Framing the Regulation as an internal energy market measure and as part of the Customs Union avoids the risk of a Member State veto.
However, as it stands, there are glaring loopholes in the Regulation that could allow an estimated €36.4 billion—equivalent to a quarter of Russia’s projected military budget for 2025—to continue flowing to the Kremlin through ongoing gas and oil exports until 2028. This sustained revenue stream would fuel Russia’s war effort and deepen the suffering inflicted on Ukraine.
- Long Grace Periods
The delayed ban on spot market gas purchases until 2026 is unjustifiable. These volumes are relatively small and easily replaceable, and allowing them to continue serves no strategic purpose—only Russian profit. Between July and the end of December 2025, CREA estimates that the EU could pay Russia €1.2 billion for LNG spot market purchases during the proposed wind-down period. The European Commission should interpret any add-on, spot-based contracts to the existing agreements between Gazprom and EU-based gas trading companies as violations of the Regulation.
- Exemption on Long-Term Contracts
The derogation from the Regulation on long-term contracts until 2028 will enable both Gazprom and the privately-owned LNG supplier, Novatek, to maintain access to the European gas market while securing contracts with alternative, new buyers in this period. This delay in the phaseout strategy creates an incentive for European traders to maintain or even expand imports. To make Russian gas unattractive, the Regulation should include a provision to tax the gap between discounted Russian gas and prevailing hub prices in Europe (for example TTF as index). This will force traders to seek ways to terminate their long-term contracts with Gazprom much faster if they are to remain profitable. Furthermore, companies should be required to purchase only the minimum volumes of Russian gas under usual take-or-pay clauses in their long-term contracts, discouraging them from maximising imports.
- Natural Gas Supply Origin Transparency
We welcome the introduction of Article 7 in the Regulation, assuming that all gas entering the EU from non-EU countries will be treated as Russian by default. However, there are a number of entry points that are missing from the list, including those linking the Ukrainian gas transmission system with the EU gas network. This could present an opportunity for Gazprom to work in tandem with other major non-EU gas suppliers, such as Azerbaijan, in exporting Russian gas under swap agreements via Ukraine.
In addition, the Russian gas transit from Turkey to non-EU gas importers in the Western Balkans (Serbia, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) passing through the EU market (in Bulgaria) will be exempted, allowing for new creative schemes for the reexport of the gas under changed ownership documents to the EU market. Considering that Western Balkan countries are members of the European Energy Community, which aligns all EU and national energy policies and legislation, there is no legal reason for the proposed Regulation to exempt the Russian gas transit from Turkey.
In addition, the rules on the customs authorities, checking on the origin of the gas entering the EU common energy market, are not enough if there is no proper EU oversight and enforcement. The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) or the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) should be allowed to do ad-hoc inspections and document verifications. Past experience shows that some Member States lack either the capacity or the political will to enforce these rules effectively.
- Oil Supply Derogations
There are no technical or economic reasons to maintain the derogation from the EU ban on Russian oil imports. A comprehensive assessment by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air and the Centre for the Study of Democracy confirms that alternative supply routes are viable and underutilised. Hungary’s and Slovakia’s continued reliance on Russian oil imports has undermined EU sanctions and strengthened Russia’s economic and military power. Despite EU exemptions allowing these countries to maintain Russian crude imports, which have generated €5.4 billion in tax revenues for the Kremlin, there has been little effort to decouple from Russian energy sources.
- Weaknesses of National Phase Out Plans
The inclusion in the Regulation of national phaseout plans for Russian energy allows each Member State to set its own pace and approach to the process of decoupling from Russia. This could open the door for national governments to obstruct and delay the collective EU response to Russian aggression. Without clear and legally-binding milestones and penalties, Russia-dependent countries will use the national documents to claim that the provisions of the Regulation are an excessive burden to their energy security, leading to a protracted legal battle after 2028 about whether the Russian decoupling was achieved or not. Moreover, the deadline for Member States to submit national phase-out plans should be moved forward from March 2026 to September 2025 to help accelerate their energy diversification efforts. The EU continues to spend over €1.5 billion per month on Russian fossil fuels, leaving little justification for further delay in implementing targeted energy sanctions. Ultimately, Member States should have begun developing these strategies back in 2022, when the REPowerEU initiative was first introduced. We therefore urge the European Commission, European Parliament, and Member States to amend the proposed Regulation with the following key measures:
Implement an immediate ban on spot market gas purchases from Russia.
Terminate all long-term gas contracts with Gazprom and Novatek by December 2026 at the latest.
Introduce a tax on the price gap between Russian gas and EU market prices, eliminating arbitrage profits and making Russian gas economically toxic.
Mandate enforcement at the EU level, through bodies such as OLAF and the EPPO, to ensure effective, uniform implementation of traceability and transparency requirements.
Eliminate or strictly regulate national phaseout plans for Russian energy imports, ensuring they include clear timelines, measurable milestones, and enforceable penalties for non-compliance or delay.
Europe faces a historic choice: real leadership now demands legislative action that strikes with precision and force at the heart of the Kremlin’s war economy, namely its energy revenues. We urge the Commission to strengthen its legislative proposal, closing the financial lifelines to Putin’s regime once and for all. There can be no true energy security, no lasting peace in Ukraine, and no green transition while Russian energy continues to power the Kremlin’s war machine.
Sincerely,
• Nezir Sinani, Executive Director, B4Ukraine Coalition
• Martin Vladimirov, Director, Energy and Climate Program, Center for the Study of Democracy
• Isaac Levi, Europe-Russia Policy & Energy Analysis Team Lead, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air
• Sascha Müller-Kraenner, Executive Director, Deutsche Umwelthilfe
• Anastasiya Shapochkina, President, Eastern Circles
• Dr. Svitlana Romanko, Director, Razom We Stand
• Alex Prezanti Co-Founder & Lead Counsel, State Capture Accountability Project