

Wed, Nov  
16, 11:33  
PM

**Corporate Media  
Relations Team**

to  
Ellie

Hi Eleanor,

Please find TI's statement on Russia below:

TI stopped sales to Russia and Belarus at the end of February and we no longer support sales there. We are working to remove outdated references that may appear on our website. Also, TI does not sell into Iran. TI complies with applicable laws and regulations in the countries where we operate. We do not support or condone the use of our products in applications they weren't designed for. Please find our statement on our [Newsroom](#).

Are you able to update your company list to accurately reflect our position?

Thanks,

TI Media Relations

**From:** Ellie Nichol <[enichol@businessforukraine.info](mailto:enichol@businessforukraine.info)>

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 15, 2022 2:48 PM

**To:** Corporate Media Relations Team <[mediarelations@ti.com](mailto:mediarelations@ti.com)>; EMEA media relations <[EMEAmediarelations@ti.com](mailto:EMEAmediarelations@ti.com)>; TXN <[TXN@ti.com](mailto:TXN@ti.com)>

**Cc:** Ilan, Haviv <[havivi@ti.com](mailto:havivi@ti.com)>; Bahai, Ahmad <[Ahmad.Bahai@ti.com](mailto:Ahmad.Bahai@ti.com)>; Leonard, Shanon <[sleonard1@ti.com](mailto:sleonard1@ti.com)>

**Subject:** [EXTERNAL] Request for a meeting with Texas Instruments regarding business operations in Russia

Dear Sir/Madam,

Please find attached a letter for the attention of Rich Templeton and Texas Instruments' Leadership Team and Board of Directors to request a meeting regarding business activity with Russia. Kindly ensure that it reaches their inboxes.

Best regards,

Eleanor Nichol

Executive Director

B4Ukraine

Rich Templeton  
Chief Executive Officer  
Texas Instruments Incorporated  
12500 TI Boulevard  
MS 8658  
Dallas, TX 75243

CC: Texas Instruments' Executive Team and Board of Directors

14/11/22

RE: Texas Instruments' business operations in Russia

Dear Mr. Templeton,

We write to you as [B4Ukraine](#), a coalition of Ukrainian and international civil society organizations working to curtail the financial resources enabling the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the spirit of respect for the fundamental rights of all people, the rules-based international order, and a prosperous global economy, we expect companies to demonstrate public support for the people, democracy, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, opposition to Russia's war of aggression, and alignment with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).

We request an urgent dialogue regarding potential inconsistencies between Texas Instruments' (TI) stated policies on human rights and the company's ongoing business operations and relationships in Russia that may contribute to, or be linked with, human rights harms.

TI's *Corporate Citizen Report* formalizes the company's commitment to "upholding international human rights and labour standards," and outlines TI's other human rights initiatives, such as its Supplier Code of Conduct, Supplier Environmental and Social Responsibility Policy, Anti-Human Trafficking Statement, and Conflict Minerals Policy.<sup>1</sup> In addition, TI is a member of the Responsible Business Alliance, which provides a set of industry standards that incorporate international expectations found within the International Bill of Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGPs, International Labour Organisation International Labour Standards, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.<sup>2</sup>

It has been eight months since Russia invaded Ukraine and the devastating impacts continue to shock the global conscience and shake the global economy. Russia is violating international humanitarian law (IHL), including war crimes and crimes against humanity, through attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure (e.g., mass executions, sexual violence, torture, and forcible transfer of civilians). More than 15,000 Ukrainians have been killed or injured and millions more have been forced to flee their homes, creating one of the largest humanitarian and refugee crises of modern times.

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<sup>1</sup> Texas Instruments, "2020 Corporate Citizenship Report," 2020, <https://www.ti.com/lit/ml/szso015/szso015.pdf?ts=1665953830204> (accessed November 7, 2022).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

On September 21, President Vladimir Putin escalated the war by announcing a “partial mobilisation” of the Russian population. The accompanying legislation ([Article 9 of Federal Law No. 31-FZ](#)) mandates all organisations, including the 1,500 international companies that are currently operating on a full or limited scale in Russia, to conduct military registration of the staff if at least one of the employees is eligible for military service.<sup>3</sup> They must also assist with delivering the military summons to their employees, ensure the delivery of equipment to assembly points or military units, and provide information, buildings, communications, land plots, transport, and other material means of support to the war effort.

This legislation entails new and significant legal risks for companies remaining in Russia, including potential civil and criminal liability under comprehensive sanctions regimes and recent international jurisprudence holding corporations and their officers responsible for human rights abuses abroad.<sup>4</sup> Companies may be exposed to financially material risks through operational restrictions, such as limitations of future government contracts.<sup>5</sup>

In response to this unprovoked and unjustified war,<sup>6</sup> many companies have left Russia. According to the Kyiv School of Economics Institute's #LeaveRussia [company tracker](#), TI has not made any formal statement regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine, nor its operations within, or sales to, Russia. As of October 2022, TI's website still lists a “Sales and Support” office in Moscow.<sup>7</sup> With little information regarding the status of the company's operations in Russia, it is unclear if TI has employees, technology, or other resources remaining in Russia that are at risk of mobilization orders.

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<sup>3</sup> Federal Law No. 31-FZ of February 26, 1997 "On mobilisation training and mobilisation in the Russian Federation" (as amended), <https://base.garant.ru/136945/> (accessed November 7, 2022).

<sup>4</sup> International companies remaining in Russia are now at a greater risk of violating sanctions regimes as implementation of the legislation will likely involve transacting with sanctioned individuals or entities. Furthermore, new domestic civil and criminal cases against companies involved in violations of international law demonstrate the risk of significant liability for facilitating state-sponsored human rights abuses abroad (e.g., Lafarge case, Lundin case, Castel Group indictment, Nevsun holding, and Dassault Aviation, Thales, and MBDA France criminal complaint.) Victoria Riello and Larissa Furtwengler, “Corporate Criminal Liability for International Crimes: France and Sweden Are Poised To Take Historic Steps Forward,” *Just Security*, September 6, 2021, <https://www.justsecurity.org/78097/corporate-criminal-liability-for-human-rights-violations-france-and-sweden-are-poised-to-take-historic-steps-forward/> (accessed November 7, 2022); The Sentry, “Breaking: France Opens War Crimes Inquiry Focused on Iconic Food and Beverage Conglomerate,” July 1, 2022, <https://thesentry.org/2022/07/01/7216/breaking-france-opens-war-crimes-inquiry-focused-iconic-food-beverage-conglomerate/> (accessed November 7, 2022); *Rfi*, “French technology firm charged over Libya cyber-spying,” July 2, 2022, <https://www.rfi.fr/en/business-and-tech/20210701-french-tech-firm-charged-over-libya-cyber-spying> (accessed November 7, 2022); Preston Lim, “Canadian Supreme Court Allows Corporate Liability for International Law Violations,” *Lawfare*, March 12, 2022, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/canadian-supreme-court-allows-corporate-liability-international-law-violations> (accessed November 7, 2022); Sherpa, “Aiding and abetting war crimes in Yemen: Criminal complaint submitted against French arms companies,” June 2, 2022, <https://www.asso-sherpa.org/aiding-and-abetting-war-crimes-in-yemen-criminal-complaint-submitted-against-french-arms-companies> (accessed November 7, 2022).

<sup>5</sup> Venable LLP, “Do You Contract with State Governments? If So, Beware of Emerging State Sanctions' Obligations Related to Russia and Belarus,” *JD Supra*, June 3, 2022, <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/do-you-contract-with-state-governments-6537229/> (accessed November 7, 2022).

<sup>6</sup> The UN General Assembly condemned Russia's "aggression against Ukraine" and demanded that Moscow “unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.”

<sup>7</sup> Texas Instruments, “TI Worldwide Sales & Support Offices,” <https://www.ti.com/general/docs/gencontent.tsp?contentId=29893> (accessed November 7, 2022).

According to a recent investigation conducted by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), TI was one of the largest original manufacturers of dual-use goods found in Russian weapons systems.<sup>8</sup> The study found TI supplied more than 50 unique components in several Russian systems,<sup>9</sup> including components found in “Kh-101 ALCM, a sophisticated weapon used to strike targets deep in Ukraine, including critical infrastructure and urban population centres.”<sup>10</sup> A similar investigation by *Euromaidan Press* discovered that TI components have been found in other Russian weapons being used extensively in the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, including T-72 tanks and Iranian Shahed-131 kamikaze drones.<sup>11,12</sup>

These activities risk enabling and financing Russia’s violations of IHL and human rights law during the ongoing invasion and occupation of Ukraine and violating TI’s human rights commitments. It remains to be seen how directly TI will be impacted by the partial mobilisation and the heightened legal, regulatory, operational, and financial risks associated with companies being required to provide direct support to the internationally sanctioned Russian military.

We seek to understand how TI has conducted and continues to conduct heightened human rights due diligence, per its stated policy and the UNGPs concerning due diligence in conflict-affected areas, and how the findings of such a process has resulted in these continued business activities and relationships. As noted by the UNGPs:

...the more severe the abuse, the more quickly the enterprise will need to see change before it takes a decision on whether it should end the relationship. In any case, for as long as the abuse continues and the enterprise remains in the relationship, it should be able to demonstrate its own ongoing efforts to mitigate the impact and be prepared to accept any consequences – reputational, financial or legal – of the continuing connection.

In consideration of the above points and B4Ukraine’s [Declaration](#), we request an urgent dialogue with TI’s relevant senior management and staff to discuss the company’s ongoing activities and relationships in Russia, associated risks to the people of Ukraine and the company, and potential steps to prevent/mitigate these risks. Please contact Eleanor Nichol at [enichol@businessforukraine.info](mailto:enichol@businessforukraine.info) to schedule a call at your earliest convenience so that we can find time before the 29th November.

Sincerely,

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<sup>8</sup> James Byrne, Gary Somerville, Joseph Byrne, Jack Watling, Nick Reynolds, and Jane Baker, “Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine,” *Royal United Services Institute*, August 2022, [https://static.rusi.org/RUSI-Silicon-Lifeline-final-updated-web\\_1.pdf](https://static.rusi.org/RUSI-Silicon-Lifeline-final-updated-web_1.pdf) (accessed November 7, 2022).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* Specifically, the report describes how TI’s components have been used in “digital signal processors found in various computing and processing modules in the 9M727 land-attack cruise missile, a CAN transceiver found in the electronic detonator of the KUB-BLA ‘kamikaze’ UAV, power management modules in an E95M target drone and in the Orlan-10 UAV, as well as audio codecs and converters in several of the radio sets used by the Russian Army.”

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Anton Mykytiuk, “How foreign microchips end up in Russian tanks despite sanctions,” *Euromaidan Press*, September 28, 2022, <https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/09/28/how-foreign-microchips-end-up-in-russian-tanks-despite-sanctions/> (accessed November 7, 2022).

<sup>12</sup> *Euromaidan Press*, “Iranian Shahed-131 drones have US-made components,” September 27, 2022, <https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/09/27/iranian-shahed-131-drones-have-us-made-components/> (accessed November 7, 2022).

Eleanor Nichol  
Executive Director  
The B4Ukraine Coalition