

Masahiro Moro
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Mazda Motor Corporation
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Hiroshima 730-8670
Japan

B4Ukraine 

December 18, 2025

Dear Mr. Moro and the Mazda Motor Corporation Leadership Team,

We write to you as [B4Ukraine](#), a coalition of Ukrainian and international civil society organizations committed to curbing the financial support that fuels Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine. We are writing to raise concerns about media and industry reports suggesting that [Mazda](#) vehicles have re-entered the Russian market through intermediary channels, despite the company's previous suspension of operations in Russia. We are seeking clarification regarding Mazda Motor Corporation's current policies and oversight mechanisms in this regard.

We call on Mazda Motor Corporation to:

- Immediately cease operations and completely exit the Russian market.
- Refrain from any future business, trade, or investment in Russia until Russia ends its war against Ukraine, territorial integrity of Ukraine is restored, and accountability imposed for war crimes and the destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure and property.
- Ensure that any re-engagement with the Russian market occurs only after all of the following conditions are met:
 - Ukraine's sovereignty and complete territorial integrity are restored, as recognized by international law.
 - Reparations are paid in full for all damages caused by Russian aggression, covering infrastructure, economic losses, and human suffering.
 - Accountability is imposed for violations of international law, including the crime of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Mazda has decided to [suspend operations](#) in the Russian Federation, halt parts shipments and divest from the Russian joint venture, selling its stake in the Vladivostok plant amid Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine. However, recently, credible media and industry reports have indicated that Mazda-branded vehicles are once again being supplied to the Russian market, including through intermediary channels and with reference to centralized deliveries and warranty support, prompting reports that "[Mazda has returned to the Russian market](#)".

In 2025, several independent media outlets and industry reports documented what appears to be a return of Mazda-branded vehicles to the Russian market, despite Mazda Motor Corporation's exit in 2022 following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to Autonews.ru, Mazda had [resumed deliveries of models](#) such as the CX-5 and CX-50 through local partners, with vehicles arriving at dealerships and stored in central warehouses, primarily sourced from China and accompanied by warranties, a development that has drawn criticism for the potential of imports and associated tax revenues to indirectly support Russia's war economy. Russian automotive news outlets further detailed plans by Mazda Motor Rus LLC to organize centralized imports of around [three thousand vehicles from Chinese production](#) for distribution in Russia with their own warranty support, following

meetings with local dealers earlier in the year. Subsequent coverage in late 2025 confirmed that sales of Mazda CX-5 and CX-50 were [officially available](#) through online platforms and dealer networks in Russia, and that these deliveries continued without a formal statement from Mazda's global headquarters.

A November 2025 reporting by Gazeta.Ru escalated these concerns by alleging that Mazda had moved beyond limited or indirect deliveries to [openly resume official sales](#) in the Russian Federation. The report stated that Mazda Motor Rus LLC, identified as a wholly owned subsidiary of Mazda Motor Corporation, had launched online and dealership sales nationwide, offering new CX-5 and CX-50 vehicles with official warranties and delivery across major Russian cities. The media further noted that Mazda Motor Rus had publicly announced the resumption of sales in May 2025, reported significant profits in 2024, and remained corporately linked to Mazda's global headquarters as of late 2025. Analysts quoted in the report questioned the transparency and governance of these operations, while Mazda Motor Corporation declined to respond to media inquiries, intensifying concerns about the company's potential continued contribution to Russia's war-time economy.

Separate reporting by Reuters in November 2025 provided additional context on Mazda Motor Corporation's ongoing relationship with its former Russian operations. Reuters reported that Mazda became the first foreign automaker to [lose the contractual right to repurchase](#) its former 50 percent stake in the Vladivostok manufacturing joint venture after failing to exercise its buyback option within the agreed three-year period following its 2022 exit. According to Mazda's former partner, Sollers, no proposals or inquiries were received from Mazda prior to the deadline, and the company did not respond to Reuters' request for comment. While this development suggests Mazda chose not to reclaim its legacy manufacturing assets in Russia, it also underscores that Mazda Motor Rus LLC has continued operating as a wholly owned subsidiary, raising further questions about corporate oversight, strategic intent, and the apparent disconnect between Mazda's formal exit from production assets and the resumption of commercial activity in the Russian market.

We acknowledge Mazda's decision not to exercise its buyback option for its former stake in the Russian joint venture. However, we are **deeply concerned by recent reports indicating that Mazda-branded vehicles have returned to the Russian market**. In light of these developments, we are therefore writing to seek **clarification regarding Mazda Motor Corporation's current activities, policies, and oversight arrangements related to Russia**.

In particular, we request information on Mazda's enhanced oversight and transparency measures to ensure that none of its products, technologies, or commercial activities, whether directly or indirectly, continue to contribute to Russia's war effort. This includes details on heightened human rights due diligence procedures, strengthened end-user and end-use verification, effective oversight of subsidiaries and distributors, and transparent measures implemented to prevent Mazda's vehicles, technologies, or services from supporting Russia's military or war-time economy.

In light of the above, we are writing to ask Mazda to clarify the following:

- Can Mazda Motor Corporation clarify whether the resumption of sales or distribution of Mazda-branded vehicles in the Russian Federation in 2025 has been authorized or approved by the company, including through subsidiaries, business partners, or other commercial relationships, and how this aligns with Mazda's human rights policy commitment under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights?
- What are Mazda Motor Corporation's current intentions and governance arrangements with respect to the Russian market, including the mandate, oversight, and accountability of Mazda

Motor Rus LLC, and how are these arrangements designed to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts?

- How has Mazda identified, assessed, and prioritized the heightened human rights risks associated with renewed commercial activity in Russia, particularly in the context of an ongoing armed conflict characterized by widespread and well-documented human rights abuses?
- What enhanced human rights and supply-chain due diligence measures has Mazda implemented, in line with UNGPs 17–21, to prevent, mitigate, and account for how it addresses the risk that its products, technologies, or services may contribute, directly or indirectly, to Russia's war effort or war-time economy?
- How does Mazda exercise and increase its leverage over subsidiaries, distributors, and other business partners in or connected to Russia to ensure effective end-user and end-use controls, prevent diversion or misuse, and ensure compliance with sanctions, export controls, and Mazda's own human rights standards?
- How does Mazda ensure transparency and accountability in line with UNGP 21, including through public reporting, disclosure of relevant risk assessments, and meaningful engagement with affected stakeholders and civil society organizations regarding its Russia-related operations and decisions?

We urge Mazda Motor Corporation to immediately suspend and cease all commercial activities in the Russian Federation and to take concrete steps toward a complete and responsible exit from the Russian market.

We would be pleased to discuss these matters in greater detail and therefore invite you to a meeting. Should you wish to participate in a meeting with Ukrainian and international civil society representatives, please confirm your availability by **January 5, 2026**. Kindly note that after this date, this letter and any responses will be published on the B4Ukraine website.

Sincerely,

The B4Ukraine Coalition

Akira Marumoto
Chief Executive Officer
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Japan

07/12/2022

RE: Mazda's business operations in Russia

Dear Mr. Marumoto,

We write to you as [B4Ukraine](#), a coalition of Ukrainian and international civil society organizations working to curtail the financial resources enabling the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The coalition expects companies to demonstrate public support for the people, democracy, and territorial integrity of Ukraine; opposition to Russia's war of aggression; and alignment with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Such support will also demonstrate respect for the fundamental human rights of all people, the rules-based international order, and a prosperous global economy.

We are encouraged by Mazda's decision to withdraw from Russia in response to this unprovoked and unjustified war.¹ The company has joined the growing ranks of multinational companies which, according to the Kyiv School of Economics Institute's #LeaveRussia [company tracker](#), have exited the Russian market,² thus minimising the risks of enabling and financing Russia's violations of international humanitarian and human rights law during the ongoing invasion and occupation of Ukraine.³ We note however that you say the deal would be worth one euro, bringing you the right to buy the asset back for the same amount within three years. We write now to urge you to maintain your position and, further, to use your leadership and influence to encourage other companies to follow your example.

As you may well be aware, Russia continues to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity through attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, mass executions, the bombing of schools, hospitals, and apartment buildings, sexual violence, torture, and forcible transfer of civilians. More than 15,000 Ukrainians have been killed or injured and millions more have been forced to flee their homes, creating one of the largest humanitarian and refugee crises of modern times.

On September 21, President Vladimir Putin escalated the war by announcing a "partial mobilisation" of the Russian population. The accompanying legislation ([Article 9 of Federal Law No. 31-FZ](#))

¹ Reuters, "Russian Carmaker Sollers Buy Out Stake in Vladivostok Joint Venture," <https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/russian-carmaker-sollers-buy-out-mazdas-stake-vladivostok-joint-venture-2022-11-10/> (accessed November 14, 2022).

² Kyiv School of Economics Institute, "Leave Russia," <https://leave-russia.org/companies-that-exited> (accessed November 14, 2022).

³ The UN Working Group on Transnational Corporations, Business, human rights and conflict-affected regions states: "Businesses are not neutral actors; their presence is not without impact. Even if business does not take a side in the conflict, the impact of their operations will necessarily influence conflict dynamics."

mandates all organisations, including more than 1,500 international companies that are currently operating on a full or limited scale in Russia, to conduct military registration of the staff if at least one of the employees is eligible for military service.⁴ They must also assist with delivering the military summons to their employees, ensure the delivery of equipment to assembly points or military units, and provide information, buildings, communications, land plots, transport, and other material means of support to the war effort.

This legislation entails new and significant legal risks for companies remaining in Russia, including potential civil and criminal liability under comprehensive sanctions regimes and recent international jurisprudence holding corporations and their officers responsible for human rights abuses abroad.⁵ Companies may also be exposed to financially material risks through operational restrictions such as limitations of future government contracts.⁶ By remaining in Russia, companies may not only be exposed to these risks but may also become directly complicit in war crimes.⁷

In addition to these risks, any reentry into the Russia market would now bring further exposure to the heightened legal, regulatory, operational, and financial risks associated with companies being required to provide direct support to the internationally sanctioned Russian military.

We request a dialogue with Mazda's senior management and staff to discuss how the company may exert its influence with other companies and consider its potential future relationship with Russia as well as Ukraine. Please contact me at enichol@b4ukraine.org to schedule a call at your earliest convenience.

⁴ Federal Law No. 31-FZ of February 26, 1997 "On mobilization training and mobilization in the Russian Federation" (as amended), <https://base.garant.ru/136945/> (accessed November 14, 2022).

⁵ International companies remaining in Russia are now at a greater risk of violating sanctions regimes as implementation of the legislation will likely involve transacting with sanctioned individuals or entities. Furthermore, new domestic civil and criminal cases against companies involved in violations of international law demonstrate the risk of significant liability for facilitating state-sponsored human rights abuses abroad (e.g., Lafarge case, Lundin case, Castel Group indictment, Nevsun holding, and Dassault Aviation, Thales, and MBDA France criminal complaint.) Victoria Riello and Larissa Furtwengler, "Corporate Criminal Liability for International Crimes: France and Sweden Are Poised To Take Historic Steps Forward," September 6, 2021, <https://www.justsecurity.org/78097/corporate-criminal-liability-for-human-rights-violations-france-and-sweden-are-poised-to-take-historic-steps-forward/> (accessed November 14, 2022); The Sentry, "Breaking: France Opens War Crimes Inquiry Focused on Iconic Food and Beverage Conglomerate," July 1, 2022, <https://thesentry.org/2022/07/01/7216/breaking-france-opens-war-crimes-inquiry-focused-iconic-food-beverage-conglomerate/> (accessed November 14, 2022); Rfi, "French technology firm charged over Libya cyber-spying," July 2, 2022, <https://www.rfi.fr/en/business-and-tech/20210701-french-tech-firm-charged-over-libya-cyber-spying> (accessed November 14, 2022); Preston Lim, "Canadian Supreme Court Allows Corporate Liability for International Law Violations," *Lawfare*, March 12, 2022, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/canadian-supreme-court-allows-corporate-liability-international-law-violations> (accessed November 14, 2022); Sherpa, "Aiding and abetting war crimes in Yemen: Criminal complaint submitted against French arms companies," June 2, 2022, <https://www.asso-sherpa.org/aiding-and-abetting-war-crimes-in-yemen-criminal-complaint-submitted-against-french-arms-companies> (accessed November 14, 2022).

⁶ Venable LLP, "Do You Contract with State Governments? If So, Beware of Emerging State Sanctions' Obligations Related to Russia and Belarus," *JD Supra*, June 3, 2022, <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/do-you-contract-with-state-governments-6537229/> (accessed November 14, 2022).

⁷ Nataliya Popovych and Bennett Freeman, "Russia's Putin is forcing foreign-owned companies to participate in his conscription campaign. It's time to get out," *Fortune*, October 13, 2022, <https://fortune.com/2022/10/13/russia-putin-foreign-owned-companies-conscription-campaign-sanctions-ukraine-war-international-europe-popovych-freeman/> (accessed November 14, 2022).

Sincerely,

Eleanor Nichol
Executive Director
B4Ukraine